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ARISTOTELIAN INFLUENCE 
on 
IRVING BABBITT'S HUNrANit;M 
~ e are safe in assuming that all students of humanism would 
give Aristotle an imp ortant place as a part of the foundation 
for their philosophy. For Aristotle was the first great hu-
manist of the West just as Confucius had been the first great 
humanist of the East. 
It is, however, a difficult question to give even a relative 
estimate of the influence that Aristotle has exerted on the 
mind of any great humanistic scholar of our own time. 
Humanists of our own day have at least the following advan-
tages over Aristotle. They have the discoveries and results 
of experiments of scientists who have appli~d ~ositive and 
critical methods to the physical world. Aristotle, a ~ositive 
and critical scientist himself, would ha ve come to different 
conclusions about many things pertaining to both human and 
natural life had he been familiar wi t :h certain truths known 
today. In the realm of literature and fine arts Aristotle was 
limited for his brilliant analyses to the small body of Greek 
literature of three thousand years ago. Again, in the field of 
government Aristotle had little as a basis for his theories of 
political science save the city states of Greece with their 
accepted powerful slave forces a t the bot.tom of the structure. 
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Perhaps the most important consideration of all is the fact 
that Arist otle was cut off from the great humanistic tradition 
of Confucius and the equally great religious traditions of 
Buddha and Christ. These personalities might have exercised 
a profound influence · on Aristotle's philosophy of the higher 
happiness and ' of the ultimate end of life. 
It would be possib l 'e to elaborate into volumes, covering 
the whole realm of human and physical knowledge, points where 
the intelligent scholar of today would have to part company 
witQ. Ari stotle. But such documents, if not unintellige·nt, 
would be of little consequence, for great thinkers are not so 
much concerned with the thoughts and discoveries of Aristotle 
that apply only to his age and must be considered either out -
grown or f~llacious today as with the profound thoughts of 
Aristotle that perhaps wisdom wil l show do not belong to any 
particula r time or place. 
One who reads and studies the humanistic philosophy of Prof. 
-Irving Babbitt will be &t once impressed with the continued 
reference to thoughts and opinions held by Aristotle. The 
rea der will di scover that these thoughts and ideas taken from 
Aristotle's works cover a very wide range of interests dealing 
not only with man's creative activities but also with man's 
life in all its aspects both individual and social. The in-
vestigator will find that along certain lines of thinking Prof. 
Babbitt is as Aristotelian as Aristotle himself. A humanistic 
scholar like Prof. Babbitt has been able to go beyond his mas-
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ter and more completely form the structure that makes for a 
higher happiness and a stronger hold on the things of the 
spi.ri t, not so much by a study of Aristotle 1 s p robable errors 
as by a mastery of· his wisdom. 
This means that we are dealing almost altogether with the 
positi ve qualities of Aristotle and as far as we can determine 
with the p ositive influence that these ideas have had upon 
Babbitt's own thinking. Furthermore, as has already been in-
ferred, we are not harboring any notion that Prof. Babbitt 
considered Aristotle as an infallible source of knowledge. It 
is interesting to note Babbitt's criticism of Lessing who set 
up Aristotle's 11Poetics" as a source of authority without 
error much as Luther had set up the Bible. He says: "Lessing 
in his attack on neo-classic formalism, remained more or less 
of a formalist himself by his insistence on an infallible 
Aristotle."l Later in this same book Babbitt says: "Lessing, 
again, shows too rigid a sense of law when he asserts that 
Aristotle's 'Poetics' is as infallible as Euclid; he should 
at least have allowed for the possibilities of non-Euclidean 
geometry." 2 Any student who has read the "Ethics" realizes 
that Aristotle's own attitude toward standards was not like 
Lessing's. Aristotle saw, as no other ancient humanist had 
ever seen, the essential element of relativity in any concep-
tion of rules. He saw the dangerous pit-falls of conformity 
1. The New Laokoon, p. 38. 
2. Ibid., pp. 190, 191. 
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and the eternal necessity of the ever active use of perception 
if one was to keep moving toward the center of the changing 
oneness. Like his teacher, then, Babbitt was not given to 
making the mistake of considering even the "Poetics" as in-
fallible. 
It is at this point that I should like to begin a considers 
ation of the probable influence that the "Poetics" have had 
upon the development of Babbitt's literary philosophy. 
I have already s·poken of the fact that Aristotle interested 
himself in the excellence of the limited body of literature 
available to him. If Aristotle had been familiar with later 
forms of art, as, for example, the pastorals of Virgil or the 
grand opera of our own ti~e, he might have written other sig-
nificant criticisms about literary art. However, we are not 
so much concerned with what he didn't say. We are concerned 
with those criticisms that he has given us in the "Poetics 11 
which still can be applied to all art. If it were not possible 
to apply Aristotelian principles to the art of modern times, 
it is not logical that Aristotle would have exerted any deep 
influence on Prof. Babbitt. 
Scott-James points out the universal and therefore modern 
significance of Aristotle in the following passage: 11 His 
principles for Greek literature are clearly given. That is 
what matters, and it would be idle to guess what he would 
have said about Shakespeare or -Shaw if he had been differently 
brought up. But it does interest us very much to know what 
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there is in his wise analysis of Greek p oetry which touches 
principles of all literature, and is therefore not irrelevant 
even for the student of Shakespeare or Shaw." 1 
Everyone who has read Babbitt's writings knows that he was 
considerably influenced by the Aristotelian conception of 11 mem-
esis," or imitation , which receives treatment early in the 
"Poetics". Aristotle meant by the word imitation an objective 
representation of life. It is perhaps clearer to say that 
memesis meant an imaginative reconstruction of life. 
Scott -James gives a somewhat too simplified yet very clear 
idea of Aristotle's conception of imitation in the following 
passage: "The tendency at the Greeks, in striving to give 
expression to their visions in p oetry or sculpture, was to 
seek dis tinction by selection and concentration rather than by 
novel -devices. 11 2 Prof. Babbitt's contrast of the Platonic 
conception of imitation wiith that of Aristotle shows the in-
fluence of the latter on his literary philosophy. "For a 
sound doctrine of i mitation we need to turn from Plato to 
Aristotle. Plato conceived of imitation in the arts as some-
thing literal and uninspired and therefore so disparaged it as 
to prepare the way for later obscurantists; whereas Aristotle 
bends his whole effort to showing that imitation may be ideal, 
or, as we should say, creative. It becomes creative in direct 
proportion as it succeeds in rendering the universal through 
1. The Making of Literature, p. 53. 
2. Ibid., p. 54. 
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the particular."1 
Aristotle conceived the objects of this imitation as beings 
in action. These beings are not necessarily human beings. 
Every word as well as every act of this being in action must go 
toward giving a constructive presentation of character. If we 
are to understand Aristotle's idea of character imitation, we 
must turn to Aristotle's own def i nition. He says in the "Poet-
ics": "Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing 
what kind of things a man chooses or avoids. Speeches, there-
fo r e, which do not make thi s manifest, or in which the speaker 
does not choose or avoid anything whatever, are not expressive 
of character. 112 But a character expressing moral purpose i s 
not necessarily a character endowed with conventional moral 
ex cellences. However, Aristotle conceived a character as a 
being the life of whom must b e considered serious l y by men 
capable of serious, balanc ed reflection. Aristotle was think-
ing of character, not as it act ually is, but as it is conceived 
through the powers of the artist, aided by the concentric imag-
ina tion, when he said that Homer "makes men better tha n they 
are."
3 However, even if a character is detached from ce r tai n 
moral values and p roves essentially cruel, the sum total of 
the artistic presentation as Aristotle saw it must be wholly 
ethical. 
All that has been said in this concise treatment of Aris-
1. On Being Creative, pp. 11, 12. 
2. The P oetics: Tr. by Butcher, p. 29. 
3. Ibid., p. ll. 
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totle's c oncEption of the place of cha racter in art is strictly 
humanistic and in keeping with Babbitt's own ethical position. 
Prof. Babbitt d i d not believe that the characters depi cted in 
the great body of romantic literature of the past century 
could, on the whole, be taken seriously by those capable of 
balanced reflection. These noted wr i ters of the nineteenth 
century, in allowing a limitless ideal of love and uncontrol-
led emotional desire to take the place of an ethical philos-
ophy of life and of any true controlled conception of religion, 
naturally had to dispense with all p ossibility of consistent 
charac ter portrayal. The following criticism of Browning by 
Prof. Babbitt, although he is he r e pointing out the weaknesses 
of an aimless a rt, clearly indicates a lack of ethical charac-
ter. uBrowning is capable of almost any amount of intellect-
ual and emotional subtlety, and like the half-educated p erson 
he is deficient in inner form: that is he deals with exper-
ience impressionistically without reference to any central 
pattern or purpose. It is enough that the separate moments 
of this experience should each stand forth like 
'The quick sharp scratch 
And the blue s purt of a lighted match.' 
one may take as an illustration of this drifting toward the 
melodramatic the 'Ring and the Book. 1 The method of this p oem 
is peripheral, that is, the action is viewed not from any centr 
but as refracted through the temperament of the actors. The 
? 
twelve monol ogues of which the poem is composed illustrate the 
tendency of romantic writing to run into some 'song of myselft 
o r 'tale of my heart.' The 'Ring and the Book' is not only 
off centre, but is designed to raise a positive prejudice 
against everything that is central. Guido, for example, had 
observed decorum, had do~~ all the conventional things and is 
horrible . Pompilia, the beautiful soul, had the great ad-
vantage of having had an indecorous start. Being the daught-
er of a drab, she is not kept fro~ heeding the voice of nat-
ure . Caponsacchi again shows the beauty of his soul by vio-
lating the decorum of the priesthood. This least represent-
ative of priests wins our sympathy, not by his Christianity , 
but by his lyrical intensity. 111 It is enough to say tha_t 
giving "a semblance of seriousness to what is at bottom un-
ethical"2 in character portrayal had nothing in common with 
true humanism ancient or modern. 
Now in order for us to get a more thorough and more de-
tached view of character imitation as understood by Aristotle 
and thoroughly believed in by Irving Babbitt, it is a good 
idea to consider character on an ethical basis apart from 
character imitation.' For an unde rstartding ·artd ~ppreaiation 
of character i mitation demands an understanding of the very 
nature of character as Aristotle saw the problem. It is nee-
essary also to see distinctly this conception of character 
1. Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 212. 
2. Ibid., p. 213. 
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over against. the naturalistic conception which Prof. Babbitt 
so vividly exposes in his arguments a gainst romanticism both 
from a literary and from an ethica l standpoint. 
_ Ethically considered, on what basi s might an individual be 
thought of as having worthy character? Ear l yin the "Ethics" 
Aristotle makes clear to us that he considers the aim of life 
as happiness. Goodness for its own sake is not the aim of 
li fe , yet goodness is a very vital thing. Here is Aris totle's 
own statement: "And of this nature Happ iness is mostly thought 
to be, for this we choose always for its own sake, and never 
with a view to anything further: whereas honour, pleasure , 
intellect, in fact every excellence we choose for their own 
sakes, it is true (because we would choose each of these even 
if no result were to follow), but we choose them also with a 
view to happ iness, conceiving that through their instrumental-
ity we shall be happy: but no man chooses happiness with a 
view to them, nor in fact with a v i ew to any other thing what -
soever."1 What Aristotle really wan te d was a clear idea of 
hap piness and the way to it . 
Man, Aristotle affirme d , is different from other animals in 
that he has the power to reason. It is through the faculty of 
reason that he may move toward happiness. Aristotle also 
conceived of character, whether good or bad, as the result of 
what he termed "habituation." He meant by this that character 
1. Ethics: Tr. by Chase , p. 10. 
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was the result of repeated actions which had a similar quality 
about them. Good character resulted from the repetition of 
good acts, all of which had a com.rnon element in them. Aris-
totle believed that the individual himself must strive stren-
uously in order to develop good character. 
But Aristotle was sensible enough to realize what the nat-
uralists have usually ignored, and that is that the individual 
needs direction and discipline from without along with his own 
efforts in order to move toward what is more central, or more 
excellent. The Greek word "arete," however, meant more than 
the Engli sh word "excellence," its nearest equivalent. "Arete" 
connoted excellence, ability, and capacity. Now this excel-
lence of character could come to a man only through the exer-
cise of clear judgment and self-control. He must work for 
a symmetry of his own desires. Excellence came as the result 
of a guided experience, a harmonious working of inner control 
set against proper external imitation. It is no wonder that 
a humanist like Prof. Babbitt, who believes likewise about 
character, has no faith in an emotional naturalist like 
Rousseau, who sets up as an infallible guide to hap~iness the 
mere worship of his own emotions. The Aristotelian conception 
of character at once places great value on traditions and 
rules of conduct. This does not mean that Aristotle looked 
at the traditions of the past, however good they might be, 
as at an exact center. It does mean, though, that Aristotle 
was clear-headed enough to see that character could not very 
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well result without imitation. He believed that the mind 
must work relatively on the best materials of man's experiences 
if one is to move . towards excellence. 
Will Durant gives this satisfactory interpretation of what 
Aristotle conceived as a road to excellence of character: 
"The golden mean, however, is not, like the mathematical mean, 
an exact average of two precisely calculable extremes; it 
fluctuates with the collateral circumstances of each situation, 
and discovers itself only to mature and flexible reason. Ex-
cellence is an art won by training and habituation : we do 
not act rightly because we have virtue or excellence, but we 
rather have these because we have acted rightly. 111 
Aristotle makes hi~self understandable in the following 
passage: "The Good of Man comes to be 'a working of the soul 
in the way of Excellence,' or, if Excellence admits of degrees , 
in the way of the best and most perfect excellence. And we 
must add, in a complete life; for as it is not one swallow or 
one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a 
short time that makes a man blessed and happy." 2 We might 
note here that this humanistic conception of Aristotle does 
not seem to have much in co~~on with Browning's theory of the 
"kiss of one girl," or with the romanticists' pursuit of some 
impossible she even in its most Platonic sense, if such a 
sense be possiblel After reading the "Ethics" the writer 
1 . The Story of Philosophy, p . 86. 
2. Ethics: Chase, p. 12. 
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feels ·that if Aristotle had lived in the late nineteenth cen-
tury he would bave dealt with the romanticists much after the 
manner · of Irving Babbitt. Wi th his remarkable powers of anal-
ysis he ~ight have been a force in helping to break up a na-
turalistic psychology that seems to know no laws for the makine 
of character. 
When Aristotle said that the good of man is the working of 
the soul in the way of excellence in a complete life, he at 
once proves himself to be a teacher of Irving Babbitt and at 
the same time at opp osite 'poles to the romanticists of any 
age, whether that age be of a decadent Greek or Roman civil-
ization or of a d~cadent modern Occidental civilization. 
Moral responsibility enters into Aristotle's conception of 
character building. For man has a power of self-direction. 
To be sure this power of self-direction depends upon direction 
from without, since to be working toward a center demands 
not only a right use of the perceptive imagination but also 
the existence of the right models for imitation. 
It goes almost without saying that Aristotle as well as 
Irving Babbitt had confidence in man's power to work con-
stantly toward a nobler and safer way of living, not only 
individually speaking but also in relation to the welfare of 
humanity at large, if only man would make a right use of the 
imagination. Both a humanist like Aristotle and a humanist 
like Prof. Babbitt, in spite of the fact that Babbitt's hu-
manism is something more than Aristotelian, had faith in the 
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fact that the world's accumulated store of high teaching s were 
ind i s pensable materials for -i mi tat i on. Let ~hese things b e 
viewed through a veil of illus i on and man could move from a 
relat_ive central i ty toward what was more central. Such a 
philosophy allowed for a normal working in the ordinary l i fe 
of each ind i vidual. At least as far as the mind was concerned 
it prepared the way for a hi gher realization of ethical chare 
acter. 
The i dea may occur to the reader that this philosophy of 
humanism as thus far p resented is too much on the human level 
and not enough on the level of divinity. We have now reached 
a point where we could consider whether there is not some in-
completeness in Aristotle's thinking. When Aristotle moves to 
his h i ghest consideration of the best life and on to a con-
ception of God as the Unmoved :Mover, does he somewhat part 
company with his p ractical phi losophy? It is this question, 
along with other questions dealing with the elements of humane 
ity and divinity as expressed in the philosophies of not only 
Aristotle, but also Confucius, Buddha, and Chri st, tha t we will 
reserve for treatment later on. 
You will remember that we were considering the Aristotelian 
conception of what is meant by character i mitat il on. This con-
ception of character in art was so related to the Aristotelian 
conception of cha r acter in life that we left the "Poetics" and 
turned to the "Ethics" where Aristotle treats the character of 
the good man and shows us that he conce i ves man as a respon-
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sible moral agent living in a wor l d where he faces the p roblem 
of g ood and evil, but, nevertheless, where he can exercise a 
p ower over hi s own passions of ex9ansiveness through an inner 
as well as an out er working of imaginative reason. 
Vl e are now a ble to return to the "Poetics" with a better 
idea of what Aristotle considere d proper representation of 
character in literature. Yet Aristotle did not conceive of 
character as of first importance. He p laced plot in first 
place. In this connection he wa s talking about the Greek 
traged i e s which he considered the highest form of the drama . 
"The P lot, then, is the first p rinci p le, and, as it were, the 
soul of a tragedy: Chara cter holds the second p lace. ----e--
Thus Tragedy is the imitation of an a c tion, and of the agents 
ma i nly wi th a view to the action." 1 Now it is our :purpose to 
c onsid er p lot, just as we have considered character imitation, 
in order that we may better understand on what common ground 
Aristotle and Prof. Babbitt meet in their philosophy of hu:rp.an ... 
ism. 
Our first problem is a consideration of what Aristotle mean 
by plot. He showed that plot had to do with the structure of 
the i ncidents, the a rra ngement of the things that were done. 
Although Aristotle maintained that plot, chara cter, and though 
were essential to tragedy in this respective order of import-
ance, he kept ins isting that p lot came first. hat he said 
1. The Poetics: Butcher, pp. 27, 29. 
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about the tragedy applied also to the epic poem, and there is 
no reason to believe that he 'wouldn't have applied his theory 
of pl ot to Shakespeare's plays or to the novels of later lit-
erature. 
But when we consider modern literature we wonder if Aris ... 
totle was right in giving such emphasis to plot. It certainly 
is not so much Shakespeare's loosely woven plots that give 
his plays such powerful quality; it is rather the compel ling 
and forceful chara cterizations that stand out. The stringing 
together by a Fielding or a Dickens of episode after episode 
does not constitute strong plot. On the other hand the char-
acterizations of these writers are often of the highest qual-
ity. Su rely in Dickens's "David Copperfield" character has 
first place over plot. 
Yet the Aristotelian point of view of plot does not infer 
that such writers have failed to create literature of real 
merit. Aristotelian thinking would, however, point out that 
all such writers might have been greater artists if they had 
had the creative genius to have subordinated their compelling 
characterizations to the soul of literature which was the plot. 
This does not mean that the characters would necessarily have 
been less compelling, but it does mean that every thought and 
every action of these charCJ.cters would have moved toward a 
definite end. We would have had far superior -art. Let us 
turn to Butcher's translation and quote to some length Aris-
totle's own reflections: "But most important of all is the 
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structure of the incidents. For tragedy is an imitation, not 
of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in 
action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. Now 
character determines men's qualities, but it is by their ac-
tions that they are happy or the reverse. Dramatic action, 
therefore, is not with a view to the representation of char-
acter: character comes in as subsidiary to the actions. 
Hence the incidents and the plot are the end of a tragedy; and 
the end is the chief thing of all."l 
Mahy references can be made to Prof. Babbitt ' s own criticisrr,p 
of literature, which prove that he held strictly to this Aris-
totelian statement that "the end is the chief thing of all." 
Let us give attention to Babbitt's criticism of Keats's ":B.;n ... 
dymion" for its lack of plot unity. "The end, says Aristotle, 
is the chief thing of all; but Keats's interest is not so 
much in the end as in the incidents and delights of the journey 
He cares little for the logical linking up of his story, if 
only it afford him the opportunity to travel in the realms of 
gold. Poetry thus understood is less a progress toward a 
specific goal than a somewhat disconnected series of beautiful 
words and beautiful moments." 2 
Here is an interesting quotation from "The )laking of Liter-
ature" by Scott-James that sums up very nicely the hu: nanistic 
position: "Aristotle said that the plot was the 'soul' of a 
1. The Poetics: Butcher, p. 27. 
2. The New Laokoon, p. 76. 
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Tragedy, and we are not_straining his meaning far if we s ay 
that plot is the whole situation, and that a good pl ot is a 
significant situation, so arrange d that its significance is 
wrung out of it to the uttermost. When we demand a plot in 
a ny important sense of the term we are asking for a s ituation 
in which characters, themselves alive and interesting, shall 
b e caught, tried, perplexed or harrassed, and so put to the 
test by ci r cumsta nce that what is humanly essential in them 
is exposed to our view. This is the sort of plot whi ch Aes. 
chylus and Sohpocles chose. In like mann e r our own George 
E liot, Thoma s Hardy, Meredith, Henry James, ma d e their char-
a cters subservient to a pattern of life, or at least an in-
teresting fragment of a pattern. 11 1 Scott-James also writes: 
"Even for the prodigal , extrava gant Shakespeare, whos e plots 
are so often the object of blame, character is an instruTient 
f or rirea ting a significant situati on. And I do not t h i nk 
t hat effectual use can be made of Shakespeare as an argument 
a gainst Aristotle. 112 
Let us kee p in mind that Aristotle _never thought of inita~ 
tion in a pseud o-cla ssic sense. Our modern realists, the 
romanticists on all fours as Babbitt defines them, are likely 
to be powerless to develop a ny plot at all. J!'or plot, as we 
h a ve seen, impli es the _;>ossibil ity of di rection towa.rd some 
possible end . The romanticist is bound to fall far short of 
l. The Making of Literature, pp. 63, 64. 
2 . Ibid., p. 64. 
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significant plot creation. It will make BO difference whether 
he has withdrawn to some Arcadia for the sake of writing about 
the projection of himself on the landscape, or whether he has 
become deterministic and has dec ided to reveal to the wor ld in 
the language of despair how everything is p itted against his 
special genius. In ei ther case the romanticist has part e d 
company with any dualistic sense of character and is the vic-
tim of his restless emotions. "The end is the chief thing of 
all" has become engulfed in a psychology of effortless d rift-
ing down a muddy stream of self-indulgence . 
"Rousseau and Romanticism" is a kind of continuous exposure 
of the lack of ethical direction in the literature of modern 
times, of a lack of the conception that "the end is the chief 
thing of all." ?rof. Babbitt is p ointing out this lack of 
true dramatic quality in the romantic literature of recent 
ti1nes when he writes the following interesting criticism of 
Shelley and Victor Hug o, both of whom ignored individual 
responsibility and disbelieved in ethical power of direction: 
11 It does not then much matter from the dramatic .90int of view 
whether the burden of responsibility for good or evil of which 
you have relieved the individual is shifted upon 'nature' or 
society. Shelley, for example, put s the blame for evil on 
society. 'Prometheus Unbound, ' in which he has developed his 
c onception, is, judged as a play, only an ethereal melodrama. 
The unaccountable collapse of Zeus, a monster of unalloyed 
and unmotivated badness, is followed by the gushing forth in 
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man of an equally unal l oy, ed and un::not1· vated go d mh o ness. l._e 
whole genius of Hugo, again, as I h~ve said in speaking of his 
use of antithesis, is melodramatic . His plays may be des-
cribed as parvenu melodramas. They abound in every variety of 
startling c ontrast and strange happening, the whole pressed 
into the service of 'problems' manifold and e v en of a phil-
osophy of history. At the same time the povert y of ethical 
insight and true dramatic motivation is dissimulat ed under 
p rofuse lyric~l outpourings and purple patches of local color. 
His Hernani actually glori f ies in not being a responsible 
agent, but an 'unchained and fatal force,' and so more capable 
of striking astonishment into himself and others. Yet the 
admirers of Hugo would not only promote him to the first rank 
of poets, but would have us share .his own belief that he is 
a seer and a p~ophet." 1 
We have seen that Aristotle's demands are not met by the 
pure romanticist who writes about things that are only aimless 
wanderings of the imagination, nor by the romantic realist 
-v ho presents the accidents of life, merely things that happen 
to have happened. The po e t is · concerned with truth, and nei-
ther expansive fancies nor p hotographic realism give Aristote -
lian truth. Aristotle says: "It is not the functi on of the 
poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen, -- what 
is possible according to the law of probability or ne c es s i ty . ' ' ~ 
1. Rousseau ann Romanticism , pp . 189-19-J. 
2. The Poe t i c s: But cher, p. 35. 
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In this same section Aristotle explains that poetry is more 
philosophical and is a higher thing than history. "]'or, " he 
says, "poetry tends to express the universal, history the 
Jarticular. By the universal I mean how a person of a certain 
type will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of 
probability or necessity." 1 Aristotle conceives of true poet-
ry as going to the heart of what is significant in action and 
character. The characters express through words and actions 
what is true for all human nature and therefore what is uni-
versal or central. Prof. Babbitt more or less indirectly 
shows his alliance with Aristotle as regards the doctrine of 
the universal in the fol lowing passage. According to the 
profound doctrine of Aristotle "the final test of art is not 
it s originality, but its truth to the universal. The question 
is one of special interest because we are living in an age 
that comes at the end of a great era of expansion, comparable 
in some ways to that of the Renaissance, Now, as then, there 
is a riot of so-called originality. In the name of this orig-
inality art is becoming more and more centrifugal and eccen-
tric. As a result of our loss of standards, the classicist 
would complain, we are inbreedfng persona l and national }e-
culiarities and getting farther and farther away from what is 
universally human." 2 We see that Babbitt places himself at 
once on the side of Aristotle in favor of a c e nter and at op-
1. The Poe tics: Butcher, p. 35. 
2. Literature and the American College, pp . 219, 220 . 
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posite poles to the romanticists who are expansive rather than 
representative. 
An interesting account of the Aristotelian position is sum-
med up by Scott-James in the following long quotation: "So 
the mere 'hu.rnan document' of which we hear so often, the pre-
sentation of 'slices out of life,' accurate pathological re-
cords of happenings in the lives of sons and lovers, or young 
men artists, or 'creatures that were once men,' would none of 
them have satisfied Aristotle. The matter presented in such 
works may be of great . interest to science, in so far as it is 
recorded fact. Such things may have interest, too, for cur-
ious, exploring minds. But however informative, interesting, 
or even thrilling they may be, the author of the 'Poetics' 
would conclude that they have nothing to do with poetry and 
that they do not touch the province of fine art. For the 
artist, concerned with truth, it is of no great importance that 
a thing actually did happen. The point for him is, Ought it 
to have happened? Is its happening in this way an accident 
among the episodes of life, or is it represent ative of life, 
1 
and expressive of what the artist feels to be true?" 
No student can read Ari s t otle's "Poetics" without a firm 
conviction that Aristotle had no faith in any school which set 
up an idea of art without universal standards. This ethical 
conception of art is contrary to the schools of art for art's 
1. The Making of Literature, pp. 6? , 68. 
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sake. .\Vhen Irving Babbitt considers what he calls the "sham 
religion of art" in his exposi tion of romantic melancholy, he 
goes further and contrasts the ethical conception of art with 
the romantic conception. Babbitt says: "Ethical beauty such 
as one finds in the Greeks at their best resides in order and 
proportion; it is not a thing apart but the outcome of some 
harmonious whole . Beauty in the purely aesthetic and uneth~ 
ical sense that Flaube rt gives to the word is little more 
than the pursuit of illusion. The man who thus treats beauty 
as a thing apart, who does not refer back his quest of the 
exquisite to some ethical centre will spend his life Ixion-
1 like embracing phantoms." I n considering the devotees of 
art for art's sake and the ru ~ n~ not only of art but of char-
acter that they succeeded in dragging down upon their melan-
choly s ·ouls, Babbitt makes the following statement: "Har.dly 
anywhere else, indeed, will one find such accents of bitter-
ness, such melancholy welling up unbidden from the very depths 
of the heart, as in the devotees of art for art's sake ---
Flaubert, Leconte de Lisle, Theophile Gautiert 112 
While still considering the plot, Aristotle said that the 
poet will prefer "probable impossibilities" rather than "im-
probable possibilities ." When this is clearly explained, it 
will be found a very vital part of Aristotelian literary phi-
losophy. wnen Aristotle nmde this statement, he was thinking 
1. Rousseau and Romanticism, p . 341. 
2. Ibid., p. 341. 
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of the epic poem with its better uossibilities for presenting 
irrational and superhuman action. The meaning of this is all 
the more significant since it can be applied to the literature 
of our own time, especially the novel. When Homer miracu-
lously transports Odysseus across the sea and leaves him on 
the shores of Ithaca, we have a p robable impossibility. On 
the other hand, if Homer had had Odysseus commit some act that 
was inconsistent with his character, he .7ould have given us 
an improbable possibility. 
This criticism of Aristotle, it se ems t6 me, exposes the 
uglin~ss of the sham-art and literature of the romanticists. 
Are not the p robable impossibilities of "Alice in V~ onderland" 
far superior to the sickening sentimentality of so::ne movie 
hero who was such a failure at first because he was so head -
strong but later, when he suddenly saw his error, became his 
boss's right-hand man of gentility and dec orum'i' Ou r det ermi n-
isti c novels written by men b itter with the world because the 
world offers their egoism some resistance in its pursuit of 
happiness divorced from ethical values, give us a welter of 
cowardly, egoistical, down-trodden souls whose actions are 
blamed on either the out er world of circumstance or else on 
the wrong influe nce of their fellow men. Surely Aristotle 
would cl~ss these books and their authors, all void of any 
ethical standards or ethical responsibilities, as outside the 
realm of true art. Such authors can produce little else save 
improbable possibilit i es. 
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That Prof. Babbitt had little sympathy with this kind of 
individual, whether in life or in art, is well brought out in 
the · following passage where he was speaking of Rousseau. "A 
man may dodge his duties as a father, and at the same time 
pose as a paladin of humanity. Rousseau is very close here to 
our most recent agitators. If a working girl falls from chas-
tity, for example, do not blame her, blame her employer. She 
would have remained a model of purity if he had only added a 
dollar or two a week to her wage. 111 The point that I con-
sider significant in this statement is the fact that this not 
only depicts the emotional naturalist's attitude toward life 
but also the attitude of the average author and general read-
ing public as to what makes a first .class novel. Conceptions 
of probable impossibilities seem to be beyond the realization 
of such subrational and demoralized victims of naturalism. 
Let us consider now one of the most significant discussions 
in Aristotle's "Poetics," namely the subject of katharsis. 
Aristotle said that through pity and fear tragedy effected 
the purgation of man's emotions. Will Durant gives the fol-
lowing interpretation to Aristotle's meaning: "But above all, 
the function of art is catharsis, purification: emotions 
accumulated in us under the pressure of social restraints, 
and liable to sudden issue in unsocial and destructive action, 
are touched off and sluiced away in the harmless form of 
theatrical excitement; so tragedy, 'through pity and fear, 
1. Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 156. 
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effects the proper purgation of these emotions.'"l He also 
says that "in this theory of catharsis" Aristotle "has made a 
suggestion endlessly fertile in the understanding of the al~ 
most mystic power of art. 11 Durant says that "it is an i llum-
inating instance of his ab i lity to enter ever:r field :)f spec-
ulation, and to adorn wha.tever he touches. 112 scott-James does 
not seek to closely define katharsis but he does :n.ake the f o l ... 
lowing interesting general definitions, leaving the reader to 
consider for hi'llself what is right. "Whe ther 'Katharsis 1 
means the purging away of the emotions (which I think improb~ 
able) or purifying them by purging away the dross, providing 
an outlet of emotions which are a part of man's nature, which, 
though they might wreck hi~ if called forth in the · experience 
of ac t u a l life, may pass through him with a harmless shudder 
tn the experience of poetry ,._ these interesting questions I 
leave to those concerned with the pathology of art. Enough, 
for the moment, that the author of the 'Poet ics' lays down 
that tragedy at all times makes its appeal through the emotions 
-- · through pity and. fear -- that it can succeed only when it 
arouses the pity and. fear proper to it." 3 
Prof. Babbitt, in showing that katharsis must be associated 
with the Aristotelian conception of the universal, gives a 
clear and confident picture of the meaning of this term . 
He writes: "Aristotle's 'Katharsis,' the most dic1cussed term 
1. The Story of Philosophy, pp . 84, 85. 
2. Ibid., p. 85. 
3. The Making of Literature, p. ?0. 
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in criticism, can be interpreted rightly only in the light of 
his doctrine of the universal. A great tragedy portrays pas -
sion and po.rtrays it vividly; at the same time it generalizes 
it. The spectator who is thus lifted into the atmosphere of 
the universal tends to be purged of everything that is petty 
and purely personal in his own emotions. He partakes in some 
measure the exalted peace that is felt in the background of 
true tragedy. He is 'dis~issed,' in Mi lton's phrase, with 
'calm of mind all passion spent.'"l Here we have at once a 
clear definition of katharsis and one that depicts the individ@ 
ual's own experience in witnessing the dramatization of high 
tragedy. Prof. Babbitt's definition of "katharsis" offers 
one a touch-stone for discovering what is real tragedy and 
what is false tragedy. 
Ar istotle never fails to give ethical meaning to his anal~ 
yses of life· and art. Tragedy that just shocks an individual 
is not true tragedy. If a good man is brutally treated and 
goes from prosperity to adversity through no fault of his own, 
there can b e no true tragedy. An Aristotle would see no op-
portunity for the purgation of the emotions in following a 
Tess to her execution. Hardy's statement the "Fate" hud had 
its sport with Tess would not have had true tragic meaning for 
Aristotle. So we might go on and enumerate those circumstances 
of tragedy outside the Aristotelian realm of high ethical art. 
But we can sum up the whole matter by saying that true tragedy 
1. On Being Creative, pp. 12, 13. 
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in the classical sense does not exist unless the refined and 
rational spectator is lifted out of himself into the atmospherE 
of universality where his emotions are relieved ~f all that is 
pet ty and pure ly personal. Does not the purgation of one's 
emotions offer a control to the self in us that is centrifugal 
and &t oppo~ite poles to the self in us that belongs to the 
universality of all human nature? The purgation of Qne 's 
emotions lead s the individual, it seems to me, from what is 
central in his concentric self to what is more cent ral. 
It goes almost without saying that the great bulk of roman-
tic and realistic tra.gedy of the past one hundred and twenty-
five years hopelessly fails to meet the high demands of Aris-
totle's ethical judgment. This ~iterature can be dismissed 
in that it fails to recognize the humani stic as we ll as the 
truely religious conception of character; in that it fails to 
recogni~e the p ossibility of standards set above what is mere -
ly rational; in that in being naturalistic it has lost a visior 
of man's free and dual nature. Vithout a conception of super-
r at ional standards there can be no vision. And where ' there is 
no vision the people seem to perish. Prof. Babbitt's whole 
argument in "Rousseau a nd Romantici sm" is a protest against a 
kind of literature that fosters the growth . of a destructive 
outer self and offers little or nothing that can lead man to 
know his inner self and find a home in universal truth. 
We have already found out that a study of the "Poetics" 
and its literary humanism is closely related to a study of 
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the 11Ethics" a nd what ~i€ht te cal l er'\ a humanism of indi vidual 
character. Undnuhte~ly t~A rleep a nd fundamental aspects of 
classical humanism have their source in the "Ethics" . ':e are 
not surprised to find Prof . Babbitt's own v i ews on character 
and cha racte r development ve ry si milar to those la id down by 
Aris t otle in this greatest c la3si.cal contribution to hu.."D.ani Gm . 
First of al l considerations h e takes the Ari stote lian stand 
aa regard s the duality of hul"rlan nature. There is the inner 
self and the outer self in every indi vi dual. The inner self 
is uni ve rsal. The outer self i13 novel. The development of 
the inner self makes it poss i ble for man to come closer and 
closer to what is central , balanced, harmonious, controlled. 
Unless the outer self which cries for novelty and wonder and 
urges the i ndividual to drift away from all idea of central-
ity is held in check, there can be no moving toward exc el -
lence of character. The humanist believes tnat the outer self 
has a defini te part to play in character development, but un-
les s the individual eternally wills it toward a higher ideal 
of control it will carry him into a realm where he becomes an 
ou tcast with himself and the world of the universal. It is 
this classical theory of duality that i s a lso a part of the 
great traditions which uphold the idea of the presence of 
good and evil. Man is a responsible agent and to a great 
extent can of himself follow the council of his inner self. 
"Labor to keep alive in your breast that spark of celestial 
fire called conscience 11 • Perhap's this motto that Washington 
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considered such a valuable guide to life is at once humanistic 
and religious on a high level. 
As we have already seen, Aristotle believed that a man 
.c ould work toward centrality if he understood his own dual 
nature. M:an must be aware of the pov1er of "habituation." He 
must understand that repeated actions where the same elements 
are present result in strong habit. 
of thought and 'llove-rnent are of the most vi tal consequence. 
These repeated actions ~ust be centered about one's inner self, 
else >nan will move out of the real~ of universality. What I 
have mentioned thus f a r not only applies to Aristotelian hu-
m~nism but also to that of Prof. Babbitt • . 
But how is a ..-nan to be guided? Accordi ng to Aristotle man, 
by use of his imaginative reason which pe rc eives the mG.terials 
of reality through a veil of illusion, is led from what is 
central to what is more central. Aristotle's conception of 
what I speak of as the materials of reality puts a res:ponsi -
bility on society . For these materials of reality must be 
good themselves whether they be the sayings of men or records 
of action. The agent contributes to the formatton of his own 
character by eternally pulling in himself. But his own ~cts 
of i mitation through a veil of illusion implies outer guidance. 
His models, which are not for slavish imitation, must, nevere 
theless, whatever their mixture of goodness and badness, be 
such as to contribute toward building excellent character. 
Aristotle believed that intellectual i~struction was not enough 
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to assure excellence of character. There must be a continuall:, 
developing and growing understanding through controlled effort. 
As time goes on, the individual finds it easier to work from 
what is central to what is ~ore central. This is due to the 
law of habituation and to the wisdom that comes to a man as 
he moves on in his q_uest for a more excellent character. 
It is at this point, as I have inferred before, that the 
reader may have a feeling that something very im_~;ortant is 
missing in Aristotle's philosophy of life. Are we not approacb 
ing the point where Babbitt's hu~nism plainly shows itself to 
be something more than Aristotelian? Is Aristotle's idea that 
the end of moral conduct i s e s sentially reasonable conduct 
altogether sound in practice? We would not criticize the doc-
trine of the golden mean which has found expression in not 
only Aristotelian philosophy but in that of Confucius and Buds 
dha as well. Aristotle 's be l "ef that the repetition of acts 
which lie at the mean of h uman experience leads to good conduct 
a nd toward excellence of character is altogether reasonable. 
He believed that this iaw of "nothing too much" could be brok-
en up into a complete se t of rules . These rules, based on 
the idea of the "golden mean," could form the materials for 
imitation through a veil of illusion. This view is all right, 
at least, as far as it goes. 
'e have now reached a point in Aristotle's treatment of 
chara cter and character development where we should consider 
the very important arguments and ideas ex9ressed in Book VI 
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of the "Ethics." For it is here that Aristotle tries to show 
that goodness of intellect is related to goodness of charact er 
and therefore to general conduct. He also desires not only 
to define goodness of intellect but also to discover its high-
est form. 
Prof. J. A. Smith makes clear much of Aristotle's meaning 
in the fo llowing statement: "Aristotle is not an intuitionist, 
but he recognizes the implication in conduct of a direct and 
immediate apprehension both of the end and of the charact er 
of his circumstances under which it is from moment to moment 
realised . The directness of such apprehension makes it anal-
ogous to sensation , or sense-perception; but it is on his view 
in . the end due to the existence or activity in .man of that 
power in him which is the highest thing in his nature, and akin 
to or identical with the divine nature -- mind, or intelligence. 
It is this which reveals to us what is best for us 
.._, . 
...... vne 1"' 
deal of a ~appiness whictl is the object of our real wish and 
the goa l of all our efforts. But beyond and above the prac-
tical ideal of wha t is best for man begins to show itself an-
other and still higher ideal -- that of a life not distinc-. 
tively human or in a narrow sense practical, yet capable of 
being participated in by man even under the actual circumstan--
ces of this world • .,l 
If we believe that J. A. Smith's analysis is correct, I 
wonder if Aristotle does not leave a gap between the practical 
l. Ethics; Chase, p. XX . 
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ideal of the individual's striving and the higher ideal of hu-
~an endeavor? Is it not true that, after Aristotle has given 
a practical human philosophy of life, he passe.s over to an-
other higher view of life which leaves the first considerations 
on a plane that is perhaps too pract ical for man's good? 
Yet we all think of man as a finite creation of an infinite 
God. :Perhaps the way toward a home with God, however finite 
it may seem and however infinitely far removed from Aristot-
le1s O\Vn abstract conception of God as the "Unmoved Mover," 
is through the relative idea that hap~iness is the end, a hap-
p iness conceived of as essentially the result of human excel-
lence. If there seems to be something missing between a kind 
of prudential and utilitarian human happ iness and the higher 
happiness of the contemplative philosopher living in a realm 
quite removed from the activity of life, does it not after all 
indicate that God is an infinite spirj_t and man is a finite 
creature that can only approach God through a finite ~lan? 
But let us reserve our final judgment. J. A. Smith infers 
that when Aristotle passes from a humanistic level of cold 
analysis to an inspired, religious level of contemplation, he 
seems to have developed two sides of a great arch without the 
necessary keystone . 
J. A. Smith's interpretation of Aristot le 's conception of 
a philosophy of life seems to point out a lack of completeness. 
He tries to render Aristotle 's enti re meaning of happiness in 
the following passage: "Pleasure is, the ref ore, a necessary 
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element in the best life, but it is not the whole of it nor 
the principal ingredient. The value of a life depends u pon 
the nature and worth of the a ctivity which it involves; given 
the maximum of full free ·action, the maximum of plea-sure nee-
essarily follows. But in what sort of life is such activi t y 
possible? This leads us back to the questiDn, ' What is Hap-
piness?' In what life can man find the fullest satisfacti:m 
I 
for his desires? To this question Aristotle gives an answer 
which cannot but surprise us after what has p receeded. True 
Happiness, great satisfa ction, cannot be found by man in any 
form of 'practical' life, no, not in the fullest and freest 
exercise possiblP- of the ' moral virtues,' not in the life of 
the c itizen or of the great soldier or statesman. To seek it 
there is to court failure and disappointment. It is to be 
found in the life of the onlooker, the disinterested spectator; 
or, to 9ut it more distinctly, 'in the life of the phi losophe r, 
the life of scientific and philosophic contem11lation.' The 
highest and most satisfying form of life possible to man is 
•the contemplative life; 1 it is only in a secondary sense and 
for those incapable of this life, that the practical or moral 
ideal is the best. It is true that such a life is not dis-
t.inctively human, but it is the privilege of a man to partake 
of it, and such participation, at however rare intervals ani 
for whatever short a period , is the highest Happiness which 
human life can offer. All other activities have value only 
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because and in so far as they render 'this' life p ossible ." 1 
J?rof . J. A. Smith critic izes Aristotle for obscuring the lower 
ideal of pra.ctice with the higher ideal. He also seems disap-
pointed, because realization of the higher ideal can come to 
only a gifted few. Prof. Smith fails to even suggest how this 
obscurity might be remedied. He only leaves one to wonder if 
t he keystone of this arch between practi cal happiness and the 
highest happiness must not ever remain in a meaningless flux. 
If we believe with Aristotle that we must be a lways working 
fr om what is central to something more central, we are vvilling 
to grant that the keystone of the arch should remain in a flux. 
But unless that intangible keystone can connect satisfactorily 
the real and the ideal, good conduct may not result even when 
the mind is informed . 
So far Aristotle's humanism has not been presented with a 
satisfactory degree of completeness. A more complete idea of 
Aristotle 's position will result as we approach a better un-
derstanding of Prof. Babbitt's individualistic and social hu-
manism, and as we get a better idea of its relation to the 
humanism of the East and to the great religious traditions of 
the East . In the introduction to "On B~ing Creative" Prof . 
Babbitt :aakes a comparison bf!tween Occidental humanism and the 
great tradition of the :b'ar Ea.st that is associated ·with Con-
fucius. In the Far East tradition of humanism divinity in 
1. Ethics; Chase, pp. XXII, XXIII . 
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rnan has had first place over man 's humanity . Prof. Babbitt 
makes the following statement: "There is, however, an idea to 
which Confucius gives a central place and which is almost en-
tirely absent, not only fram Cicero but from Ari stotle, who 
may be considered, doctrinally at least, as the most important 
of occidental human ists-- the idea, namely, of humility . It 
is hard to distinguish between a humanism, like that of Cic .... 
ero, which does not go beyond reason, and Stoicism. This more 
or less stoical huma nism has entered as an element, often a s 
the d ominant element, into many noble lives; yet t he rea.son 
that has the support of a higher will, that is, in Confucian 
phrase, submissive to 'the will of heaven,' wou l d seem bet ter 
able to exercise control over the natural man than a reason 
that is purely self-reliant. At all events, it is this higher 
will that I have in mind whe n I raise t~e question whether 
something has not be en omi tted in our modern philosophies of 
l if e that may turn out to be the keystone of the arch. 111 
We can be s u re t hat Prof. Ba bbitt's human ism a llows f or co-
operation with a higher wil l i dent ified with God and made 
possible through the conception of divinity. 
That Babbitt thought of Aristotle at his best as being res 
ligious and close t o the great religious traditions of the 
East is well brought out in the following passage: "Plato 
frequently and Ari st ot le at times mount frora the humanistic 
1. On Being Creative, pp. A~I, XVII. 
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to the religious level. One of the most impressive pa.ssages 
in philosolJhy is that in v;hich Aristotle, perhaps the chief 
exponent of the l aw of measure, affirms that one who has real -
ly faced about and is moving t owards the inner infinite ~eeds 
no warning against excess: ' We should not give heed, ' he says, 
•to those who bid one think as a mortal, but so far as we can 
we should make ourselves immortal and d o all with a view to 
a life in accord with the best Principle in us. ' (This Prin-
ciple Aristotle goes on to say is a man's true self.) 11 1 But 
is this, after all, a satisfactory concegtion of man ' s spirM 
itual relationship to God? Does it riot have a spirit of in-
dependence that is too far removed from the Lastern human-
ists' idea of man's necessary relation to the God above him? 
Maybe the error of Aristotle, even at his best, is due to a 
too independent view of man's p ower to rise on a basis of mind 
to a higher hap~Jiness. P ossibly there is an essentially hu-
man need of dependence through a doctrine of divine grace that 
does not at the same time jeopardize man's other essential 
need of relying upon his humanity. v'e are now reaching the 
very heart of the p roblem of the relation of humanism to re~ 
ligion. 
Let me quote from almost the conclusion of Prof. Babbitt ' s 
"Rousseau and Romanticism." "The solution of the problem as 
to the relation betvreen humanism and religion, as far as a 
l. Rousseau and Romanticism, pp. 253, 254. 
36 
solution can be found, lies in looking upon them both as only 
different stages in the same path. Humanism should have in 
it a n element of religious insight: it is possible to be a 
humble and med itative humanist. "1 Later Babbitt says: "If 
humanism may b e religious, religion may have its humanistic 
si_de. I have said, following Aristotle, that the lavv of mea-
sure does n ot apply to the religious life, but this saying is 
not to be understood in an absolute sense. Buddha is contine 
ually insisting on the middle path in the religious life it -
self. The resulting urbanity in Buddha and his early follow~ 
ers in India is perhaps the closest approach that that unhu-
manistic land has ever made to humanism. It is right here in 
this joining of humanism and religion that Aristotle, a t leas t 
t he Aristotle that has come down to us, does not seem alto-
gether ade~uate. He fails to bring out sufficiently the bond 
between the meditative or religious life that he descri b es at 
the e-nd of his 'Ethics' and the humanistic life or life of 
'.) 
mecUation to which most of this work is devoted.""' Thus far 
Prof. Babbitt 1 s criticism does not seem very :nuch different 
from that of J. A. Smith. However, Babbitt is not sure that 
this partj_al inadequacy of joining religion with humanism is 
strictly Aristotle's fullest philosophy . Babbitt limits his 
state·m.ents with "at least the Aristotle that has come down to 
us." 
1. Rousseau and Romanticism, p . 380. 
2. Ibid . , p . 381. 
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Prof. Bahbi tt makes mention of the fact that a :B'rench au-
thority complained that Ar i stotle 's "separation of the two 
lives encouraged the ascetic excess of the Middle Ages , the un-
due spurning of the world in f a vor of :nystic contem_b) l a tion. 111 
Babbit t then makes the very important statement t hat he is 
"struck rather by the danger of leaving the humanistic life 
without any support in rel igi on. 11 2 In other words, Arist otle's 
incompleteness in dealing with humanism and rel i gion makes it 
a ltogether too easy to fall into the error of having a religion 
too extremely detached from life, or else having a human ism 
se parated from a ri ght concepti on of d ivinity. Of the two 
dangers Babbitt c onsiders t he latter more seriou s. Babbi tt 
goe s on to say that the i deal e;entleman of Aristotle saw all 
thing s including himself p roportionately and that this i dea l 
g entleman put himsel f neither too high nor too low . Prof. 
Babbi tt seems to thi nk that this is all right as far as the 
i d~a l ~n 's rela tion to other me n was concerned. There is, 
however, a chance tha t t hio ideal man may fail to b e ideal af -
ter a ll, for he may not knovv the proper place of huMan nature. 
Babbitt wonders if the ideal man of Aristotle can "feel s uf-
ficiently its (human nature 1 s) nothingness and helplessness, 
its dependence on a higher power. 113 It is here that Prof. 
Babbitt seems to lay bare the one error of Aristotle, if he 
can be said to have error in his higher ideal. Is not that 
1. Rousseau and RoP.lanticism, p. 381. 
2. Ibid • , p. 381. 
3. Ibid., p. 382. 
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"almost entirely absent" element of humility at the heart of 
Aristotle's obscurity? The Aristotle that has come down to 
us was the most self-reliant of men , even if it is a self-
reliance at opposite poles to our exuberant Emerson. His self~ 
reliance seemed to blur his vision of the need of a humanism 
supported by a clearer view of human nature's helplessness 
without the support of God. At least his writings fail to 
make clear that he properly bridged the gap between his sense 
of reality and his sense of the ideal. 
Prof. Babbitt believes in a humanism supported by religion, 
rather than a religion supp orted by humanism. This is not be-
cause Prof. Babbitt discounts the value of religion. On the 
contrary, he considers it almost always necessary to the real-
ization of complete li-ving. Prof. Babbitt fears that man may, 
by giving too high a place to div1ni ty, run into the error of 
allowing h i s own efforts to relax. In relying on God more 
than on himself he runs the risk of losing sight of God alto-
1 gether. 
A rounded expression of Aristotle's humanism, giving a 
more complete conception of its wisdom, is not possible with-
out a consideration of the ideas found in the "Politi cs." 
This means, or course, that a full estimate of Aristotelian 
influence in Babbitt's humanism d.emands that we give attention 
to such conceptions ot· thi s volume that have influenced Prof. 
1. Democracy and Leadership, p. 6, and 
Rousseau and Romanticism, p. XX. 
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Babbitt. We must, then, consider the nature of the "Politics" 
and search out those ideas that are a part of Babbitt's own 
social philosophy . 
Vie have already found out that the "I:;thics" describes the 
kind of character that is neces s ary for the go od life in the 
Aristotelian sense. An individual can work toward the good 
life if his continued actions are such as to form good habits. 
And the formation of the se habits is possible when the individ -
ual directs his mind toward the control of expansive desires 
and has for outer guidance p roper forms for imitation. We 
have seen that the one probable weakness in Aristotle's other-
wise brilliant and practical philosophy for developing ex cel-
l e nce of character was a too self-relj_ant spirit and faith in 
the sufficiency of mind without the support of divinity. 
But Aristotle's practical widsom was too great for him to 
make the error ·of thinking ex cellence of character as only a n 
individual consideration. He saw more clearly than almost any 
other grea t thinker that man could not separate himself from 
society and progress toward the goal of character. The clever 
theories of a Henry Thoreau are left hanging on empty space 
after one studtes Aristotle and sees the vital need of man for 
a common relation with what is es s entially true of all men . 
Aristotle did not conce ive of an Elysium peopled by a fancied 
population, rather he saw possibilities of a satisfactory so-
cial order made up of men that really live and led by men of 
this world. 
40 
Emotional, and scientific and utilitarian naturalism have 
so crowded out any truly humanistic conception of a social 
order that it is a good idea at the out se t to draw some broad 
contrasts between Aristotle's views of government and society 
and the views of modern times. This study wil l eventually 
lead us right back to true and false conceptions of the nature 
of individuals living together. Aristotle's whole idea of 
character was such that he could not conceive of politics as 
a struggle between individuals or classes for power. He Viould. 
view the desire for power as inevitably leading a nation of 
individuals to self-destruction. The very idea of such a strug-
gle for power implies a total lack of the conception of inner 
control as a part of individual human nature . Neither did 
Aristotle conceive of politics as a plan for the maintenance 
of order and security without too great encroachment upon in-
dividual liberty. This is rather the modern naturalistic con -
ception, which is based upon an expansive idea of liberty that 
is entirely foreign to the classical and humanistic stand. 
The modern political thinker with his naturalistic conce~tion 
of individuality rests satisfied with the idea of exercising 
a general application of outer control which comes up against 
the individual's uncontrolled desires and thus puts a stop to 
his going beyond a limit set by outer authority. The mod ern 
statesman too often aspires to build a sound government and 
a sound social order on a basis of unsound, expansive individ-
ualism. 
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Early in "Democracy and Leadership" Prof . :Babbitt mE:I.kes the 
following statement that shows himself entirely in accord with 
what has been said of Aristotle's philosophy. "My own objec-
tion to the substitution of social reform for self-reform is 
that it involves turning away from the more immediate to the 
less imnediate. In general I have sought in qy attack on the 
utilitarian-sentimental movement to avoid metaphysical and 
theological assumptions, and to rely on psychological analysis 
supported by an immense and growing body of evidence. My hu-
manism is in this sense not only positive and critical, but, 
what will be found to co::ne to the same t":li_ng, individualistic. 
Under existing con1itions, the significant struggle seems to 
me to be not that between the unsound individualist and tht 
traditionalist, nor again, as is currently assumed, that be -
tween the unsound ind ividualist and the altr~ist, but that be-
tween the sound and unsound individualist. ~o be a sound in -
dividualist, one needs, as I takt it , to retain one 1 s bo ld on 
the truths of the inner life, even though breaking more or lese 
comp letely with the :past." 1 
!he i n dividUals that Aristotle had in mind were to be so 
trained by giving heed to ha-bit and the law of measure as to 
have an idea of liberty entirely different from the modern r o-
mantic conception. This d.oes not mean that h e vras idealistic 
to the extent of thinking that all men would strive for excel-
1. Democracy an~ Leadership, P.P · 7, 8. 
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lence of character and keep before them a clear view that only 
inner liberty can lead to happiness. It means rather that he 
saw the possibility of a secure social order only where this 
wa s the general view of life and there was an educational 
system sufficient to produce enough strong men and noble lead-
ers to put this view into practice. 
For Aristotle the very idea of the need of force such as is 
practi ced so completely today in countries like Germany and 
Italy and to a grea ter or lesser degree in America was not the 
sign of a strong state but rather a definite sign of a danger-
ously weak state. He wouln say that such countries have con-
flicting misconcept ions of what is good. Unless a state can 
carry out what it has c ommonly conceived to be good and has 
agreed to do, independent from the force of outer authority, 
it is not a state. 
Just as Aristotle thought that the individual went wrong 
through ignorance and failed to account for the fact that many 
times an individual might know what is right and do evil, so 
he conceived of a nation's failure to control itself without 
force due to a lack of knowledge. Prof . A. D . Lindsay sums 
up Aristotle 1 s position in the following words: "In so far 
as men conceive the g ood rightly they are united. The state 
represents their common agreement, force their failure to make 
that agreement complete. The cure, therefore, of political 
ills is knowledge of the good life, and the statesman is he 
who has such knowledge, for that alone can give men what they 
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are always seeking." 
In Aristotle's account of political .iustice he states that 
tools are for those who can use them. As we have seen he con-
ceived the state at its best as a b ody of people seeking a 
common go od. It is therefore inconceivable that in such a 
state there should be leaders with pow~r and political p osition 
who could not direct the people toward this end. 
It is interesting to study the kind of men Aristotle con~ 
ceived as worthy and safe to be leaders of a people in the 
good state. As we have already said, such a leader mus t have 
a knowledge of the good life if he is to lead the people in 
the right direction toward political and social harmony. In 
the ideal Aristotelian sense this meant that the leader's 
rational understanding of the good that leads to real happiness 
was a sufficient guide to the control of his own expansive de-
sires. For wrong individual conduct and therefore wrong lead-
ership was due to lack of knowledge, or ignorance, of the g ood 
life. :But this view as we have seen already does not explain 
why an intelligent leader should do wrong by a pP.ople when he 
apparently knows what is good. The mind 1 s understanding of 
good arid evil is not enough at all times to assure good con-
duct. 
This separation of the real from the ideal came about as 
Prof. Babbi tt has so ably shown in "Rousseau and Romanticism" 
1. The Politics: Tr. by Ellis , p . XII. 
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and in "Demo cra cy and Leadership 11 because of the Greek empha -
sis on mind and a lack of a proper concepti on of the higher 
will. It forced Aristotle to keep his p ractica l ideas of gav -
e rnment and his ideal conceptions too far apart. ~~ e l earn that 
he became impractical in the "Ethics" when he tried to solve 
the problem of why me n know what is right and still do op~osite 
to the t:ruth. This s pirit also carries over into the "Poli -
tics" and made him sub ject to error in dealing Yvith the pr~t:! ­
tical problems of government and leadership. 
But we should not lose si ght of the fact that Aristotle is 
fundamenta l! right in realizing that a g ood leade r has been 
led through right actions to right h a b its and on to a type 
of c onduct that is above the level of s~lfi sh desires. ~e 
seem to be doing injustic e to the man who better, perhaps, 
than any other man that has ever lived saw into the real prob-
lems of life and society, and whose views of human nature were 
so correct as to enable him to build up the mos t original and 
workable _phi losophy that mankind has ever known. He completed 
his philo sophical st ructure of government as well as any mor-
tal could on the basis of the Greek mind and Greek ex er ienc e . 
Hi s work might be thought of as a perfectly p lanned home al-
most complete but unfinished be cause the builder did not have 
the necessary materials at the end. The wisdom of the ~ ast, 
united with the ·wisdom of the classic mind, has made possible· 
a more complet e home . The first builder's work was not torn 
down because the genius of that bui lder made this unnecessary. 
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Rather, the work begun was brought nearer to completion by the 
builrlers of the East whose structual powers v;ould have pr oved 
incomplete in themselves. 
Such a builder of foundations as Aristotle was not given to 
dreaming about an ideal state at the expense of the conditions 
which actually existed in the Greek city states. He had exam-
inerl with g reat care the constitutions of one hundred and fif-
ty-ei ght city states of Greece before he wrote the "Politics." 
As regards the significance of this study of political sciencE, 
Prof. Babbitt says that "Aristotle remains the chief example 
in the past of a thinker who has treated in-a way at once crit-
ical and humanistic the _problems of government." 1 He g oes on 
to say that he disagrees with Aristotle's conclusions in essen-
tial particulars. 11 But," Babbitt says, "the method itself for 
any one who aspires to be modern wou l d seem to be impeccable.n.<:: 
Aristotle knew the actual conditions of g overnment which 
were very far from ideal. The aim of one state might be dif-
ferent fro'TI that of another, or the aim of a state might changE. 
Arist otle was keen enough to conceive the fact that on account 
of these different and varying conditions the qualif ications 
for g overnment vvould vary. 11 In the ideal st a _te power -;~ ill be 
given to the man with the most knowledge of the g ood ; in other 
states to men who are most trulv c apab le of achiev·ing that end 
which the citizens have set themselves to pursue . 113 It is ev-
l. Democracy and Leadership, p. 31. 
2. Ibid., :p. 31. 
3~ Politics: Ellis , p. XII. 
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ident that Aristotle saw nlainly that the a· 
.!:' vns, dEsires, and 
temper of a p eople might be far enough removed fr om real good 
as to necessitate g overnment and leadership not of the best 
type. That Prof. Babbitt took the same practical stand us re -
gards the relation of a govern'1lent to the people g ovc:. rned is 
we ll illustra ted in the following passage: "According to Aris-
totle, a government, if it is to endure, must reflect the 
' ethos' or body of moral habits and beli e fs of the governed. 
The re is no abstract and ideal p olitical f orm, as the ~rench 
J a cobins inclined to believe, that may be imp osed to <=Ld.vantage 
on a ll communities. 111 Prof. Babbitt goes on to show us in his 
book , "Democracy and Leadership, 11 that a critica l study of 
states reveals, in spite of the fact that at first there seem 
to b e ~ny different kinds of control, only three distinct 
type s, namely, humanistic , reli gi ous, and na turalistic. Bab-
bitt is Aristotelian in that he does not believe that, for 
example, the humanistic plan whi ch he favors can a chieve sa t -
isfactory results if the "ethos" of a people is funda.ment a lly 
naturalistic as seems to be the case today. He be lieves with 
Aristotle that the beliefs and habits of a people must find 
expression in their g overnment . Babbi tt's conception of a 
properly controlled government, like that of Aristotle, d e-
mands a people disciplined from within . 
we have already inferred that the Ari stotelian conception 
l. Democracy and Leadership, p. 27. 
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of government placed a great responsibility upon the education-
al system of a state or nation. For, according to Aristotle, 
a constitution after all is only the outward express ion of the 
co~mon hopes and desires of a body of people. The nature of 
these common aspirations and desires is naturally subject to 
change. And the possibility of a Greek state's moving from 
what is common and central in the Aristotelian sense to what 
is more central depended absolutely upon a whole peo~le 's 
moving from what is central to what is more central. Truth 
and freedom on a national scale from the classical point of 
vi ew depended altogether upon a sufficient number of citizens 
and leaders who hart learned the art of self~ctirection and 
freedom in the inner se~ se. 
Yet this very necessary self-control could not come to a 
group of individuals without a definitely p lanned system of 
outerguidance. It was clear in Ari stotle's mind that a wise 
system of character education was absolutely necessary if a 
nation was to have a body of moral habits and beliefs that 
would make possible the setting up of a thorough-going hum.e:m -
istic state. Aristot le would have said that an eternal effort 
toward fostering the right kind of education was the price of 
true liberty. 
Prof . Babbitt had a similar view of education. The last 
sentences that he wrote in his "Essay at Definition" are very 
charac teristic of his attitude. He said: "Economic and other 
conditions are more favorable in this country than elsewhere 
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for the achievement of a truly liberal conception of education 
with the idea of leisure enshrined at its ve ry centre. In 
the meanwhile, our educational policies, from the elementary 
erades to the university, are being controlled by humanitar-
ians. They are busy at this very moment, almost to a man, l)ro-
claiming t he gospel of se rvice . It will be strange indeed if 
dissatisfaction with this situation is not felt by a growing 
minority, if a demand does not arise for at least a few in-
stitutions of learning that are humanistic rather than human-
itarian in their aims. One is at all events safe in affirming 
that the battle that is to determine the fate of American civ-
ilisation will be fought out first of all in the fi e ld of ed-
ucation.111 
We find the same Aristotelian emphasis on direction and a 
proper sense of standards in B~bbitt's political philosophy 
that we found so characteristic of his literary and individual 
philosophy . Prof. Babbitt's beliefs in regard to the necessity 
of good h a b i ts as well as a good system of guidance is expres-
sed in the fo llowing passage: "To have standards means prac-
tically to select and reject; and this again means that one 
must discipline one 's feelings or affections, to use the older 
word, to some ethical centre. If the discipline is to be ef-
fective, so that a man will like and dislike the right things, 
it is as a rule necessary that it should become a matter of 
1. Humanism: An Essay at Definition, from Humanism and 
America, Ed. by Foerster, p. 51. 
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habit, and that almost from infancy. One cannot wait until 
the child has reached the so..;.called age of reason, until, in 
short, he is in a position to do his own selecting, for in the 
meanwhile he may have be come the victim of bad habits. This 
is the true prison house that i s i n danger of closing upon the 
growing boy. Habit must, as Aristot le says, precede reas on. 
------ --~ The ethos of a community is derived in fact, as it 
is etymologically, from habit. If a com..munity is to transmit 
certain habits to its young, it must normally come to some 
kind of agreement as to what habits are desirable; it must in 
the literal meaning of that word a chi eve a corivention. 111 
After turning to the sub.iect of social humanism we dealt 
primari ly with those thoughts of Aristotle as expressed in 
the "Politics" that were e ssentially modern and a part of Prof. 
:Babbitt's own politica l phi losophy. In bringing to a close an 
outline of the influence of Aristotle's social humanism on 
Prof. Babbitt it is best to consider in as connected a manner 
as possible certain important aspects of Babbitt's social 
humanism that rest fundame ntally on Aristotelian principles. 
In order to give completeness to this outline it will sometimes 
be necessary- to point out to what extent Prof. :Babbitt is more 
than Aristotelian. 
Prof. :Babbitt's own views as regards individual property 
rights, the nature of competition, and the nature of capital 
1. Democracy and Leadership, p. 299. 
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are quite in keeping with what Aristotle has to say in his 
"Politics." Babbitt believed that property as a means to an 
end was a necessary basis for civilization. But property as 
an end in itself would lead only to materialism . In view of 
this natural insatiableness of the human spirit, it is neces-
sary for the individual to learn how to set limits on his ex-
pansive desires for worldly goods. Unless the leaders of a 
nation have learned to exercise this control and so set the 
right examples, it would seem impossible to bring others under 
any law of inner control whatsoever . Any such attempt to 
force property rights without this example of sufficient inner 
control to back it up would always be leading toward violencea 
Prof. Babbitt . was thinking of leadership where property was 
thought of as an end in itself when he said that the "people 
will not consent in the long run to look up to those who are 
not themselves looking up to something higher than their or-
dinary selves."1 
I1 is obvious tb,at Babbitt had no faith in the mechanica l 
schemes for the division of property. He believed that the 
desires of a peo p le must be controlled from within and that 
c ontrolled desires would lead to a safe distribution of proper-
ty. He give s us a basis for his theory of property rights in 
the following passage: "Genuine .iustice seems to demc..nd that 
men should be judged, not by their intentions or endeavors, but 
1. Democracy and Leadership , p. 203. 
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by their ac tual performance; that in short the natural aris-
tocrat, as Burke terms him, shou ld receive his due reward, 
whether one attribute his supe r iority, with the man of science, 
to heredity, or, with the Christi a n, to grace, or, with the 
Buddhist, to his past working. 111 Y{e see that justice, where 
one individual comes naturally and honestly to control more 
than another, cannot be administered from without. Ethi cally 
speaking, such equality of distribution would result in ine-
quality. Babbi tt believes that real equality depends upon a 
genuinely ethical or hu!ll.anistic workine.;. He says: "To pro-
claim equality on some basis that requires no such working 
will result ironically. :F or example, this country committed 
itself in the Declaration of Ind~pendence to the doctrine of 
natural equality. The type of individualism that was thus 
encouraged has led to monstr ous inequalities and, with the 
decline of traditiona l standards, to the rise of a raw plut oc-
racy. A man who amasses a billion dollars is scarcely F.Xem-
~lary in the Aristotelian sense, even though he then proceeds 
to lay out half a billion upon philanthropy. The reme dy for 
such a failure of the man at the top to curb his desires does 
not lie, as the agitator would have us believe, in inflaming 
the desire s of the man at the bottom; nor a~ain in substituting 
for real justice some phantasmagoria of s ocial .iustice. As a 
result of such a substitution, one will presently be turning 
1. Denocracy and I,eadership , pp. 202, 203. 
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from the lJUnishment of the incUvidual offender to an attack on 
the institution of property itself."l 
This point of view is altogether in accord with what Aris-
to+l"' .. had Sal·,:; 1'n 'n1'>1 11 .,.., 0ll'tl'cs. 11 w· f' d h' k' t v-. "' ~ ;: e 1n 1m ma_lng he state 
ment that if we are to remedy ec anomie inequality, we 1mst 
"prevent those who are of a good disposition f r om desirint?; 
more than their own. 112 A further study of Ari stotle shows 
t hat he also had no faith in mechanical schemes for the divis-
i on of property. The following passa~e ~roves that Aristotle 
believed man's desires, rather than his possessions, requir€d 
equalization. "It is evident that it is not proper for the 
legislator to establish an equ~litv of circumstances, but to 
fix a proper medium. Besides, if anvone should regula te the 
division of property in such a manne r that there should be 
moderate sufficiency for all, it would be of no use; for it is 
of more conseque nce that the citizens should entertain a sim-
3 ilarity of sentiment than an equality of circumstance." 
Prof. Babbitt has said that an attack on the institution of 
property in the name of a social justice that is a mere ~han­
tasmagoria of the imagination wi ll lead to a similar attack on 
capital. He writes that a "war on capital will speedily de ... 
generate as it always has in the past, into a war on thrift 
and industry in favor of laziness and incompetence, and finally 
into schemes of confiscation that profess to be idealistic and 
1. Democracy and Leadership, p. 204. 
2. Politics, Ellis, p. 46. 
3. Ibi d., pp. 43, 44 . 
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are in fact subversive to common honesty." 1 "Above all ," 
Prof. Babbitt says, " social justice is likely to be urisound in 
its partial or total suppression of competition. Vi thout com-
p etition it is impossible that the ends of true .iustfce should 
be fulfilled -- namely, that every man should receive aGcord-
ing to his work s. 11 2 The right kind of competit ion, a compe-
titian ba lanced wi th et~ical control p is necessary to keep 
man from falling back into indolence. ·W e nee4 an ethical 
spirit of compet ition which conta ins a sound spirit ·of rivalry 
and at the same time will not degenerate into pernicious strife. 
It is the exp~nsive, naturalistic type of competition that 
leads to i mperia lism and straight on to bloody war. P rof. 
Babbitt is freely quoting Aristotle when he makes the state~ 
ment "that remedy for the evils of competition is found in the 
moderation and magnanimity of the strong and the successful, 
and not in any sickly sentimentalizing over the lot of the 
3 unrl.erdog." He concludes his argument by saying, .tha. t "the 
mood of unrest and insurgency is so rife today as to suggest 
that our leaders, instead of thus controlling themselves, are 
. 4 
guilty of an extreme p sychic unrestraint." 
we have seen that both Prof. Babbitt and his te~cher, Aris-
totle, conceived of true liberty as ·resulting fro~ the exercise 
of an inner working in a suffici 'ent ·number of pe op le firmly 
l. Democracy and Leadership, pp. 204, 205. 
2. Ibid., p . 205. 
3 . Ibid., p. 205. 
4. Ibid., p . 205. 
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SU}Jport ed by t he examples of the l eaders who had been trained 
by careful "habituation" and education not to des ire ~nore than 
what justly belonged to them. This is the definition of the 
true democracy of inner control. It · 1 h ' , 1 s on y sue a aemoc racy 
that can give the people libertr . That Prof. Babbitt had no 
faith in the expan sive type of de~ocracy and that he is in 
accord with Aristotle is revealed in the following pass·age: 
"In our recent crusade to make the world safe for democra cy it 
wa s currently a ssumed that democ racy is the same as liberty 
a nd the opp osite of i~perialism. The teachings of history are 
strangely different. Democracy in the sense of direct and 
unlimited democracy is, a s was p ointed out long ago by Aris~ 
totle, the death of liberty ; in virtue of its tyrannical tern-
p er, i ~ is likewise, in the broad sense of which I h<:we been 
t t l l k . t . . l. Ill using he erm, c ose y a 1n o 1m_pe r1a 1 sm. 
I shall now try to tie u p the whole argument of Prof. Bab-
bitt and show , to some extent, its Aristotelian founda tion by 
a general review of his connected defense of humanism f rom the 
writing of "Literature and the American Col l ege" in 1908 to 
the publication of "On Being Creative" just before his death. 
"Literature and the .AJnerican Colle ge " gives a clear exposition 
of the positions of the humanist and of the humanitarian. Tbe 
humanists b elieve in inner control; the humanitarians know no 
law of control; on the other hand they stand for outer ex9an-
1. Democracy and Leadership , p. 117. 
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sian whe ther they are utilitarian after the philosophy of 
Francis Bacon or are emotional after the teachings of Rousseau. 
\. 
Either brand of humanitarians ignore the spirit of positive 
inner working, and, in the name of service, strive for the 
outer welfare and efficiency of mankind. In "The Masters of 
Modern French Criticism" he shows that the foundation of the 
imler life is the opposition bet·ween a lower and hi.gher will. 
But the danger comes in this working when there is no true 
understanding of standards. Aristotle intuitively and ration -
ally got a right vision of standards which he explained as a 
"oneness that was always changing." He saw that there could 
be no standards unless there existed an element of oneness 
somewhere v;i th which to measure the infinite variety of things. 
The French critics did not deal positively and critically with 
the "One aml the Many" and therefore failed to set up adequate 
standards. Babbitt points out that the failure to set up a 
center for judgment th~t is above shifting impressionis~ 
endange rs civilizat ion itself. "The New Laokoon" -continues 
this argument by showing what has resulted from a progressive 
decline of standards. The result has been a debased and often 
meaningless art and literature that seems on first examination 
the direct result of emotional romanticism. But a careful 
study discloses that the true cause is an expansiye conce ption 
of imagination which is at oppos ite poles to the ethical imag-
ination of ancient classicism or modern humanism. "Rousseau 
and Romanticism" continues the argument as to the cause of the 
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decline of the arts with ~ ~ore thor ough ex~osition of both 
the wr ong ·kind of expansive imagination and the right kind of 
ethical imagination. It is in this b ook that ? rof. Babbitt 
brings out clearly the failure of the Greeks in relying too 
l''J.U ch upon reason as an aid to imagination. He shows us that 
Aristotle's hurnanis!ll needed a far stronger conception of the 
place of divini ty in human life. Add to the Greek rational 
conception of the "oneness that is always changing" thP Ori -
ental conception of the "working of the higher will" and we 
have the possibi lity of an imagination at once relatiYe in the 
Gree k sense but more powerful in perceiving the truths of ex-
perience. On the other hand, wi thout the Occidental addition 
of the "One and the Many 11 to the Oriental idea of reliance on 
the hieher will, ~an 1 s imagination is in danger of becoming 
weak from observance of f ixed beliefs. In this book we find 
that the romant ic movement was a revolt f rom the notion of 
pseudo-decorum. In other word s the worship of fixed standards 
rebounded over into the sentimental and utilitarian movement 
in w~ich we still live. He points out that man's emancipation 
from naturalis:~a depends upon a right use of imagination that 
is at once the product Jf two great trad itions. \; e see that 
Babb'itt 's humanism differs from that of Aristotle in that it 
puts the worki ng of the higher will above the Gre ek conception 
of mind, and is therefore out of danger of becoming a cold 
rationalism after the s pirit of decadent Greek humanism , or of 
becoY'ling irrational after the spirit of those who have relied 
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on God through fixe d conceptions until they have lost the ~ow­
er of COITL."lluning with God altogether. "Democracy and Leader-
ship" continues the argument for the necessary need of an 
unC!erstan . ing of the imagination and its working if we are to 
b e saved from the results of naturalism. A wrong use of imag -
ination can only give us visionary, natura listic leaders whosE 
feel ings have l ead them to be victims of either the cult of 
service or the cult of power. On the other hand the ri ght use 
of imagination can give us humanistic leaders of vision wh o 
know the liberty of inner control. Prof. Babbitt points out 
that democracy depends upon the qua lity of its leadership, and 
the y_uality of leadership depends upon the right c onception and 
the right wo rking of imae;ination. A democracy of inner control 
can g ive the only form of government con sistent with a hiehly 
humanisti c philosophy of life. On the other hand, a democra cy 
~f expansion f inally leads to the destruct i on of both individ -
ual and social liberty. The admira~le e ssays in the little 
volume '_'On Being Creative," published shortly before his death, 
belong with what has already been said in defense of a sound 
literary, individual, and social philosophy of life . 
Prof . Babbitt had a rare soul as well as a rare mind. He 
had faith without being blind to truth, hope without a false 
optimism, and love of God and man without sentimentality. He 
put into practice the motto that he so oft en repeated: "By 
their works ye shall know them. " 
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In his last great book he was still looking forwbrd toward 
a greater realization of the truths of the inner life. He ho~e~ 
that "the Occident" :ni ght "not ::mly reaffirm the truths of the 
ethi cal wi ll, but" might "reaffirm these truths in some appro-
I 
pria:tely mode rn way and ·~vi th an emphasis distinctly different 
from anything that" had "been seen in the Orient." 1 
1. De~ocracy and Lea~ersh·p, p. ~84. 
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su·.nm.ary 
Aristotle is more Widely quot ed and more often referred to 
in Irving B~bbitt's writings than is any other genius of the 
pc:t st. Without questi on Prof. Babbitt 's humani s :(rJ. rests up on 
the fourirt a tions of the Greek classical mind which found its 
clear, s e lf - reliant expression in Aristotle' s "?oetics, 11 
"Ethics," and "?oli t ics." Aristotle , better than any other 
. 
i reat thinker of the past, saw the rieed of applying the pas -
itive and critical method to the life of man as wel l as to the 
outer world. Prof. Babbitt is likewise a true positivist in 
insisting on a "law for man" as well as a "law for thinF<,. 11 . 
At the foundation of Aristotle' s literary , indivi dua l, and 
p,ocia l humanism v1as a recognition of the principle of right 
a nd wrong working in each individual. Right conduct was asso -
ciated wi ta. what was · universa lly true of all :na.nkind and led ' 
to excellence of character. Good character c ould be attained 
through the reyetition of right acts until right habits V;ere 
forme d . l[an must, by use of his own intellectual · 1Jowers and 
through his own efforts, move toward excellence of character . 
But this is not possible without a proper conception of stana 
ctards. Aris t otle saw the ~roblem of standards more clearly 
' tQ.an any other thinker of the past. Man :must learn to per-
ceive the universal elements in a constantly changing order. 
He mus ·)erce i ve this rea li tv ab out him through a veil of 
illusion. Such a view of arrivi ng at excellence of char~cter 
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P1i:t ke$ essentia l a thorou ghly planned and executed system of 
education. The individual must be trained in right habits 
from early childhood, Blse he would form wrong habits and so 
work away from universality. Ari st ot le believed that .soc i c-,1 
progress in chara cter development was essential to a s imil&r 
individual progress. Arist otle placed great emphasis on the 
need of the right kind of leadership in g overnment and society . 
He saw clearly that the "ethos" of a people must be reflected 
in the conception and methods.of g overnment. A government 
c an be good only when there is sufficient leadership through-
out a state to control and d irect the b ody of mora l habits 
and beliefs of a people toward what is more universal. 
A close· study of Irving Babbitt 1 s humanism finds him agree-
in g with all that h as been said, save that he believes Aris-
totle placed t -oo grea t a responsibility on the )6wer of the 
individual ~ind to work toward unive rsa lity. Prof. Babbitt 
is on the side of Confucius and Buddha in giving first place 
to the higher will rather than to the mind . At the same time 
Babbitt believes in grounding his philosophy in what is essen-
tially human in man according to the law of measure rather 
than in · assing too abruptly t o the supernatural level. Thus 
it is possi b le for man to reach a ~lane of b oth religious and 
human excellence that otherwise he would be in danger of los-
ing altogether. The Aristotle that has come down to us had a 
tendency to keep his rational views of life and his i dea l 
views to o far apart. Prof. Babbitt believes that this )ossible 
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error of Arist otle lay in not i)e rceiving that man is subject 
to f a ilure unless his rational imagination is strengthened by · 
the power of divinity. It follows that Aristotle's own con-
cE: ption of universality lacked completeness. To man's p owe r 
of understanding himself in relation to other men must be 
8.d.rled the vision of universal man's iependence on God. Such 
a p oint of view makes possiole a quality of imagination which 
lies at the center of Irving Babbitt's definition of humanism 
and which he thought necessary for the d evelopment and main-
terrance of civilization. 
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